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The forgotten pirates: Iraqi and Iranian pirates in the Arabian Gulf who have never been 
reported to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
 
1. Introduction 
The Arabian Gulf is one of the most important waterways in the world as it is the only way in 
and out for the vessels of the nations in the area who are the major crude oil exporters. Since 
oil production accounts for almost %90 of the economic output of the Gulf States, any 
maritime threats in the Arabian Gulf would cause serious damage to the national economies 
of the Arabian Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states1. One of the potentially major 
maritime threats is piracy which could 1) block the strait of Hurmuz thereby stopping 
navigation in and out of the Arabian Gulf which would not only harm the economies of the 
GCC states, but also harm the consumers of oil by increasing oil prices; and/or 2) cause 
damage by attacking the oil tankers and seizing their cargo, which would cause similar 
damage to the GCC states’ economy and to the world economy2. Such potential threats could 
come from Somali pirates when their operations reach the Arabian Sea and block the strait of 
Hurmuz from the south, and in the literature, Somalis are generally seen as the most likely 
source of this threat. However, what is not discussed in the literature is that the threat could 
come from Iraqi or Iranian pirates in the northern and central areas of the Arabian Gulf. The 
reason why commentators have not discussed this possibility is that while there are many 
reports of Somali pirates operating in the Arabian Gulf recorded by the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) in its records for the years 2003-2015, there are no reports 
recorded by the IMO of Iraqi or Iranian pirates operating in the northern and central Arabian 
Gulf during 2003-2012. Yet fieldwork carried out for this research revealed that both Iraqi 
and Iranian pirates were active at this time. Fieldwork carried out in 2012 and 2013 in the 
Arabian Gulf involving interviewing stakeholders in maritime security positions such as 
navies, private maritime security companies, oil tanker companies, coastguards and 
government officials, identified a significant number of piracy attacks in the North of the 
Arabian Gulf (the waters between Kuwait and Iraq), conducted by Iraqi pirates, and also 
piracy attacks in the Central area of the Arabian Gulf (the waters between Qatar and 
                                                          
1 The GCC states are Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arabs Emirates and Oman. 
2 Oil tankers and product tankers are the ships most attacked by Somali pirates, according to  International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) piracy reports between 2010 and 2015. 
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Bahrain), conducted by Iranian pirates. None of these piracy attacks by Iraqi and Iranian 
pirates were mentioned in the IMO piracy and armed robbery reports.  
There are four possible reasons why those piracy attacks were not reported to the IMO. 1) 
The attacks were not serious as the pirates attacked to get cash, personal valuables such as 
mobile phones, and GPS devices. 2) The Iraqi and Iranian pirates rarely harmed the victims 
as they did not use heavy weapons or guns like the Somali pirates, but they only used knives 
when boarding. 3) The GCC governments did not report the attacks to avoid triggering an 
increase in the cost of shipping insurance and to avoid scaring off international investment.  
4) The GCC states dealt with such piracy cases effectively resulting in containing piracy in 
the Arabian Gulf to a minimal level.  
In this article, we will discuss these four reasons in analysing the Iraqi and Iranian piracy 
attacks in the northern and central areas the Arabian Gulf, examining the motives, the causes, 
the consequences, the tactics, and the responses to this type of piracy, and suggesting the best 
strategy to deal with it. Most of the data and information provided in this paper were gathered 
during the field work in 2012 by face-to-face interviews, along with official reports on piracy 
statistics by the local coastguards and navies in the GCC. 
 
2. Methods 
In this section I will demonstrate the methodology followed to obtain all the information and 
data collected in this study. Also I will describe how this data were examined.  
 
2.1 Data collection 
The first step to obtain this study is to dig into different sources in the literature, especially in 
the IMO piracy and armed robbery reports to find out how much of all of the piracy attacks 
have already been mentioned. To the best of my knowledge none of the piracy attacks in the 
Arabian Gulf region was mentioned ever in the IMO piracy reports from 2003 to recent. 
The method followed for the data collection was within a fieldwork (semi structured 
interviews and reports, documents and archives observations) in the Gulf region. The 
fieldwork started in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and United Arabs Emirates. The fieldwork was 
conducted in summer 2012. 
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The interviews conducted were with Kuwaiti coastguards, Kuwaiti navy, Kuwaiti oil tankers, 
Kuwaiti maritime security private companies, the Kuwaiti courts’ library in the Kuwaiti 
Ministry of Justice, the Qatari coastguards, the Bahraini navy, the CTF 150, the CTF 151, the 
CTF 152 and private maritime security companies in Dubai.  
2.2 Data analysis 
After transcribing all the data gained out of the interviews and after the input all the 
evidences and piracy attacks reports requested from the interviewees such as the Kuwaiti 
coastguards, the Qatari coastguards and the Kuwaiti courts. I have imported all; the data and 
the transcripts into NVIVO software which is a software to analyse and model the qualitative 
data. After creating the model out of the NVIVO I have compared the model with the 
literature using also NVIVO and discussed all the variables analysed in this study. 
 
 3. Results 
3.1 Statistics of maritime piracy in the north and central Arabian Gulf 
There are two different locations where Iraqi and Iranian piracy took place in the Arabian 
Gulf, as illustrated in Figure 1: the North of the Arabian Gulf in the waters between Kuwait 
and Iraq, and the Central area of the Arabian Gulf in the waters between Qatar and Bahrain.  
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Figure 1 The map of the Arabian Gulf Source: (NOAA national centers for environmental 
information (NCEI), 2012) 
 
 3.1.1 Maritime  piracy in the  north of the Arabian Gulf 
 After the removal of the Iraqi regime in 2003, Iraq became a failed state and as is the case in 
failed states, the security situation became weak on land and  also at sea. Piracy increased 
rapidly in 2003 in the waters between Iraq and Kuwait. Table 1 shows the number of piracy 
attacks conducted by Iraqi pirates against Kuwaiti ships in the north of the Arabian Gulf:  
Table 1 Maritime Piracy Attacks in the North of the Arabian Gulf conducted by Iraqi Pirates against  Kuwaiti Ships 
(Source: the Kuwaiti Coastguards). 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Piracy attacks 1 31 24 6 5 0 67 
Piracy attempts  4     4 
Piracy with 
murder 
 1     1 
Captured pirates  1     1 
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As shown in Table 1, the piracy attacks occurred in the north of the Arabian Gulf between 
2003 and 2008 after the failure of the state system in Iraq in 2003.  
3.1.2 Maritime  piracy in the  central area of the Arabian Gulf 
Maritime Piracy existed and increased to its peak in the central area of the Arabian Gulf in 
the waters between Qatar and Bahrain between 2008 to 2012 against Qatari and Bahraini 
ships, conducted by Iranian pirates who travelled all the way from the coasts of Iran to Qatari 
or Bahraini waters to attack and steal ships in the area. Table 2 shows all the attacks 
conducted by the Iranian pirates: 
Table 2 Piracy attacks conducted by Iranian Pirates against Qatari and Bahraini Ships in the Central of the Arabian Gulf 
Between 2008 to 2012 (Source: the Qatari Coastguards) 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Piracy attacks 9 8 13 3 4 37 
Piracy attempts  
 
   
 
Piracy with 
murder 
 
 
   
 
Captured pirates  
 
   
 
 
From Table 2, we can see that the total number of Iranian piracy attacks which occurred 
between 2008 and 2012 in the central area of the Arabian Gulf was 37, and that such attacks 
have been contained since 2012 after the enhancement of the Qatari maritime forces, as we 
will demonstrate later in this paper. 
By comparing table 1 and 2 we can summarise that the Iraqi pirates in the North and the 
Iranian pirates in the Central of the Arabian Gulf use a minimal level of violence as we can 
see that within all the attacks happened in this region only one murder was conducted by the 
Iraqi pirates. Also the two groups of the pirates never conducted a kidnap for ransom in the 
Arabian Gulf. Concluding that the Iraqi and the Iranian pirates are one of the less dangerous 
pirates in the world when comparing them to the Somali pirates in the Indian Ocean or the 
pirates in the Asian region.  
3.2 Motivations for maritime piracy in the north and central Arabian Gulf 
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Interviews of the stakeholders of maritime piracy in the Arabian Gulf, including Kuwaiti 
Naval officers, Kuwaiti Coastguards, oil tanker companies, Iraqi pirates, Iranian pirates, 
intelligence officers, maritime private security companies and the commanders of the 
Coalition Task Forces (CTF) 150, 151 and 1523 in the U.S base in Bahrain led to our 
conclusion that most of the motivations behind piracy in the northern and central areas of the 
Arabian Gulf are purely financial. Reasons for reaching this conclusion are as follows:  
1.  Attacks in the north of the Arabian Gulf increased in 2003 when Iraqi security become 
weak after the Allied invasion of the country, and state weakness   is a typical cause of 
financial crime.  
2.  Piracy in the central area of the Arabian Gulf began when poverty increased in Iran as 
a result of the crisis 2007 in the Iranian economy, at a time when the maritime forces 
in Qatar and Bahrain were insufficient compared to the size of the area and the number 
of Iranian pirates. 
3. The level of violence used by the Iraqi and the Iranian pirates was minimal and there 
was no intention to harm the victims.  
4. The Iraqi and Iranian pirates boarded the ships in the area to steal cash, cell phones, 
food, GPS devices and other valuables, not to kidnap victims.  
5. The weapons used to attack the ships were knives not guns or explosives, indicating 
there was no terrorist motive.  
6. The targets were generally Kuwaiti and Qatari fishing vessels operated by international 
labour from Bangladesh, Egypt and Pakistan, indicating that there was no ideological 
motive such as anti-Westernism. 
 
3.3.   Causes of piracy in the north and central Arabian Gulf 
 Maritime piracy existed in the north of the Arabian Gulf conducted by Iraqi pirates between 
2003 and 2007, after which it was contained and rapidly decreased to a minimal level. 
Similarly, piracy in the central area of the Arabian Gulf conducted by Iranian pirates existed 
between 2008 and 2012, after which it was contained and rapidly decreased. Why did these 
periods of piracy occur? This section explains the causes by making use of the theory of 
rational choice. According to rational choice theory, Gullen and Agnew (2006, p. 1) state that 
                                                          
3 The Coalition Task Forces (CTF) 150, 151 and 152 are naval task forces composed of several navies in the 
world under USA Command from the U.S. base in Bahrain, whose mission is to counter piracy and maritime 
terrorism in the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean (Forces, 2016) 
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“crime occurs when the benefits outweigh the costs and when people pursue self-interest in 
the absence of effective punishments”, meaning that crime is a rational and freely-willed 
choice. Applying this theory to maritime piracy means focusing only on the financial benefits 
of the high value of ransoms or stolen goods, and ignoring political, religious and ideological 
factors.  According to this theory, pirates are self-interested individuals, intent on personal 
gain – an assumption made by Law (2011, p. 10) about Somali pirates: “the majority of 
Somali pirates are criminally minded”. Piracy is a typical robbery, hijack, kidnap or murder 
crime, and the only feature which makes it distinctive is that piracy is conducted at sea. On 
this theory, piracy is distinguished from terrorism: it has no wider dimensions but is purely 
the result of self-interest.   We explain in the next sections how Iraqi and Iranian pirate’s 
motives are purely financial due to the very weak economies of Iraq between 2003 and 2007 
and in Iran between 2008 and 2012, which led to widespread poverty and hunger as well as 
diminished state capacity to maintain law and order.  
 3.4 The causes of piracy in the North of the Arabian Gulf 
Iraq was a failed state in 2003 after the Western allied operation removed the regime. This 
led to a rise in the crime rate in Iraq as state failure resulted in reduced   security, a shrunken 
economy, and increased poverty. The heightened crime rate included a rise in piracy attacks. 
The only waterway into Iraq is via the   north of the Arabian Gulf where most of the villages 
on the south of Iraq work on fishing. Because of the absence of an Iraqi navy, the Iraqi fishers 
and villagers in the south of Iraq started to operate at sea as pirates, attacking and stealing 
ships in the area, especially Kuwaiti fishing dhows.  
 Why did the Iraqi pirates not engage in kidnap for ransom as did the Somali pirates in the 
south of the Arabian Gulf and in the Indian Ocean? They could easily have kidnapped and 
dragged the hostages to the failed Iraqi state at that time and then negotiated over ransom. 
The answer to this question is complicated. According to our fieldwork, three factors must 
exist before the strategy of ransom for kidnap becomes viable. First, there must be state 
failure so the pirates can easily drag the hostages ‘home’ without being chased. Second, there 
must be a hate factor between the pirates and the seafarers. In the case of the Somali pirates, 
hatred was generated because of illegal foreign fishing and marine environmental damage 
from chemical waste dumping by western vessels in Somali waters. Third, there must be a 
geographical advantage such as a long coastline, which enables the pirates to operate more 
freely and avoid security forces at sea.  
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 Looking at the Iraqi piracy case, we can see that the first condition - state failure - was met, 
but not the second condition - there was no hate factor between the Iraqis and the Kuwaiti 
seafarers as issues such as illegal fishing or chemical waste did not exist – nor the third 
condition - there was no geographical advantage from the Iraqi pirates perspective as the Iraqi 
coastline is relatively short, and Iraqi fishermen and pirates operate in limited areas of water.    
3.5 The causes of piracy in the central area of the Arabian Gulf 
 The causes of Iranian piracy in the central area of the Arabian Gulf are different from the 
causes of Iraqi piracy in the north. Iran suffered from an economic crisis since the revolution 
in 1979 as the Iranian regime was punished by UN sanctions, and this increased poverty and 
hunger which raised levels of crime and piracy. However, Iran is a successful state which has 
strong security forces including a powerful navy and coastguards. This made Iranian pirates 
travel south all the way to Qatar where the Qatari and Bahraini navies are less powerful than 
the Iranian Navy. The Iranian pirates also avoided the waters of Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates and Oman as those states have more powerful navies and coastguards. The same 
question arises of why the Iranian pirates did not adopt a kidnap for ransom strategy. The 
answer is that there are two missing conditions which discouraged Iranian pirates from 
kidnapping for ransom. First, unlike Somalia and Iraq (in 2003-07), Iran was a successful 
state with reasonable security meaning that the pirates were unable to kidnap and drag the 
hostages easily to Iran as they would be chased and detected by the Iranian authorities.  
Second, there was no hate factor between Iranian pirates and Qatari or Bahraini seafarers as 
no issues such as of illegal fishing and chemical waste existed in the Arabian Gulf.  The only 
condition favouring ransom that did exist in the Iranian piracy case was the geographical 
advantage that Iran has one of the longest coastlines in the area. However, this factor alone 
would not be sufficient to make kidnap for random piracy attractive to Iranian pirates.  
 3.6. The consequences of piracy in the north and central Arabian Gulf 
 The consequences of Iraqi and Iranian piracy in the northern and central areas, respectively, 
of the Arabian Gulf of were relatively slight as the pirates sought only to steal cash, cell 
phones and other personal valuables, rather than boats or cargo. Moreover, the level of 
violence was low, since the Iraqi pirates only carried knives as weapons, and although some 
of the Iranian pirates carried rifles and machine guns, they used them only to force the targets 
to reduce speed or to scare victims when they board the target vessels.  The fact is that Iraqi 
and Iranian pirates are much less dangerous than Somali pirates or the pirates in South of 
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Asia, because they do not usually damage the ships of the victims or harm the victims 
physically.  
 3.7 The tactics of the pirates in the north and central Arabian Gulf 
The Iraqi and Iranian pirates used different tactics. Iraqi pirates used two types of tactics in 
attacking ships in the north of the Arabian Gulf. First, some of them used small, fast boats to 
perform hit and run operations. The hit-and-run pirates were not fishermen but opportunists 
who came all the way from the south of Iraq to the fishing areas of the Kuwaiti waters 
seeking easy and specific targets. This type of pirate can be detected by RADAR as they 
usually travel at fast speed, in zigzag moves, moving quickly from area to area looking for 
targets. Such manoeuvres would not be performed by fishermen because Iraqi fishermen 
remain in one place for long time. Second, the other type of Iraqi pirates are fishermen who 
normally remain in Iraqi fishing areas along with other fishing boats and they attack the 
Kuwaiti ships when they see a chance and find an easy target. These Iraqi pirates prefer to 
attack and board the dhows and ships at anchor as they are easier to board and take less time 
to board, steal and run. This type of pirate is harder to differentiate from ordinary fishermen 
by RADAR, but they can be detected by several factors, including a large number of the crew 
on-board (the normal crew number on an Iraqi fishing wooden dhow is seven, so more than 
this number would be considered suspect). Two other suspicious factors are when they carry 
weapons on-board, and when they do not carry fishing gear. 
In the central area of the Arabian Gulf, Iranian pirates also used the hit-and-run strategy 
similar to some of the Iraqi pirates Unlike Iraqi pirates, however, one of the Iranian pirates’ 
tricks used to avoid being attacked by the Qatari coastguards was to target ships adjacent to 
the 12 nm border and tie the target ship with a rope to drag it out of territorial Qatari waters 
into international waters. This strategy gave Iranian pirates more time to board and steal 
goods, because Qatari coastguards would not be able to chase them in the international waters 
where they have no legal jurisdiction, and if they did so, this would be a lost case in court. In 
such circumstances, the coastguards usually contacted the Qatari navy to chase the pirates in 
international waters, but the delay involved in doing so, gave the pirates time to get  away. 
Another difference between Iranian and Iraqi pirates is that Iranian pirates prefer to attack 
target ships underway. A further difference is that because most Iranian boats near Qatari 
waters are suspected of piracy even if they are fishing, he Iranian pirates sometimes use the 
Qatari flags to camouflage their piratical activities forces in the area.  
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 3.8 Responses to piracy in the north and central Arabian Gulf 
The responses by the authorities to Iraqi and Iranian pirates in the Arabian Gulf are different.  
With regard to Iraqi pirates in the north of the Arabian Gulf, the Kuwaiti government 
engaged in a strategy to deal with the pirates as soon as the piracy started after the removal of 
the Iraqi regime in 2003. To challenge the first category of the Iraqi pirates (the small, fast 
boats carrying out hit-and-run attacks) the Kuwaiti government activated the RADAR system 
in the area tracking all the ships in the north of the Arabian Gulf, monitoring their 
movements. The RADAR system picked up any boat that came from the Iraqi side with more 
speed than usual or moving from area to area or by making zigzag movements at sea.  
Kuwaiti coastguards and navies cooperated with the new Iraqi government and its navy and 
coastguards to track and monitor all ships in the area and to exchange all report of suspects.  
For the second category of Iraqi pirates (the static fishermen who lie in wait for Kuwaiti ships 
to pass) the Kuwaiti coastguards and navy randomly inspected Iraqi ships in the area to check 
if they had more crew than usual, or whether they carried  fishing apparatus or guns. This 
strategy drastically decreased piracy in the north of the Arabian Gulf rapidly until it was 
eliminated completely by 2007. 
With regard to the Iranian pirates in the central Arabian Gulf, the response of the authorities 
was different. Because of the lack of naval units in the central Arabian Gulf, the Iranian units 
were able to attack ships nearby the 12nm borders where the coastguards cannot chase them 
but call on the navy units which take longer to respond, resulting in the pirates getting away. 
To deal with this problem, the Qatari government started a new project in 2010, which 
involved establishing, training and engaging more coastguards and naval units at sea, 
integrating them into a new huge convoy to guard Qatari waters. Also the Qatari navy 
employed naval helicopters which could to arrive at piracy locations within minutes of 
attacks. This new project virtually eliminated piracy in the central Arabian Gulf by 2012.  
4. Discussion  
This discussion focuses on a single issue – the reporting of piracy incidents to the IMO. One 
response to piracy in the north and central Arabian Gulf that was common to both areas was 
that of not reporting incidents of pirate attacks to the IMO: Kuwait did not report Iraqi pirate 
attacks and Qatar did not report Iranian pirate attacks. This was an unusual response, in that 
generally across the world pirate attacks are recorded and reported to the IMO (IMO, 2016), 
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though Marex (2016)4 stated “70% of the piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinean is never 
reported” which suggests that non-reporting may be more common than hitherto thought. 
Liwång et al. (2013, p. 101) noted that “all piracy incidents must be reported to the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB)”. 
It raises an important question – are states ever justified in breaching international law by 
failing to report piracy incidents to the IMO? One argument in favour of non-reporting is that 
secrecy may help to reduce piracy. Applying this argument to the case of the north and 
central Arabian Gulf it could be claimed that secrecy helped to fight piracy by preventing its 
escalation in the way Somali piracy, which was given huge publicity, escalated in the south 
Arabian Gulf. Announcing the danger of piracy in any area results in commercial ships taking 
precautions including the use of protection convoys and armed guards. This is what happened 
in the case of Somali piracy, where massive media coverage resulted in ships in the area 
using e protection convoys and armed guards. However, this resulted in Somali pirates 
arming themselves more heavily and becoming one of the most brutal and dangerous type of 
piracy in the world in terms of the weapons used, the level of violence employed, and the 
amount of ransom demanded. By declining to report piracy incidents, the argument runs, 
Kuwaiti and Qatari coastguards almost certainly helped to reduce the extent and severity of 
piracy attacks in the north and central Arabian Gulf during 2003-2012.  Another argument in 
favour of secrecy is that publicity can give rise to copycat piracy attacks by marginalised and 
disaffected groups of people (as claimed by several interviewees during my fieldwork in 
2012). Another consideration is that the reports of piracy attacks may be over-exaggerated: 
Liwång et al. (2013, p. 101) claimed “there is over-reporting by the commercial ships in the 
Somali basin and the Gulf of Aden as they report everything at sea which makes the maritime 
scene inaccurate by reporting all the skiffs and ships in the areas as suspects of piracy”. 
Finally, there is an economic argument - that secrecy may avoid an increase in the cost of 
shipping insurance, and the risk of scaring away international investments. Hastings (2009, p. 
217) pointed out that “reporting the piracy attacks increased the ships’ insurance premiums”, 
and that “many companies don’t report the piracy attacks when there are no human losses and 
they deal with kidnappers and ransoms without reporting them”. Also Marex (2016)5 stated 
that “70 percent of the piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinean never reported” which shows 
that this problem is common in several piracy infected regions.   
                                                          
4 Marex (2015) Chronic under-reporting of piracy. Available at: http://www.maritime-
executive.com/article/chronic-under-reporting-of-piracy (Accessed: 17 September 2016) 
5 Marex (2015) Chronic under-reporting of piracy. Available at: http://www.maritime-
executive.com/article/chronic-under-reporting-of-piracy (Accessed: 17 September 2016) 
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However, a counter argument is that failure to report piracy incidents to the IMO is a breach 
of international law which weakens the already fragile authority of that law and of the UN 
which gives the IMO its legitimacy. The IMO is an international organization set up in 1948 
under a UN Convention, and it carries legal power to obtain data on piracy attacks from the 
175 states (which include Kuwait and Qatar) who have signed the Convention. Also, it could 
be argued that the evidence that secrecy helps to reduce piracy attacks is highly conjectural. It   
may be that media publicity generates determined efforts by states to step up their anti-piracy 
operations, which, despite the temporary escalation of the conflict, is the most effective way 
of eliminating piracy in the long-term. Some commentators argue that this is precisely what 
happened in Somalia, where piracy attacks have fallen dramatically in recent (as claimed by 
some of the interviewees during my fieldwork in Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain in 2012 such as 
the coastguards, the navies and the CTF officers).  
 5. Conclusion  
 This article has identified and analysed scores of piracy incidents, which occurred during 
2003-2007 the north Arabian Gulf by Iraqi pirates and in 2008-2012 in the central Arabian 
Gulf by Iranian Pirates, none of which were reported to the IMO. The article showed how the 
motives of both Iraqi and Iranian pirates were financial; that the causes of their piracy in both 
cases was self–interest, at a time of a failed state in Iraq and weak naval forces in Qatar and 
Bahrain; that the consequences of both Iraqi and Iranian piracy were comparatively slight; 
that their tactics were different in that Iraqi pirates targeted ships at anchor whereas Iranian 
pirates targeted ships underway and dragged them into international waters; and that the 
responses by the authorities to Iraqi and Iranian piracy were different – Kuwait used RADR 
and inspection to detect and detain Iraqi pirates, whereas Qatar used helicopters to combat 
Iranian pirates. On the central question of why and with what justification Kuwait and Qatar 
declined to report these pirate attacks to the IMO, our view is that it all depends on 
circumstances: in each situation of pirate attacks, a risk analysis should be carried out to 
determine whether secrecy or publicity would be less likely to escalate the number of attacks. 
It may be that where pirate attacks are relatively slight, secrecy should be the rule, but      
where piracy attacks are severe, publicity should be the rule.    
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